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The ÔConsensus ApproachÕ of the European Court of Human Rights as a Rational 
Response to Complexity 
 
Dimitrios Tsarapatsanis 
Lecturer in Law, University of Sheffield 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The present chapter uses complexity theory to argue that the so-called Ôconsensus 
approachÕ of the European Court of Human Rights (henceforth Ôthe CourtÕ or ÔECtHRÕ) 
can be a rational response to the cognitively demanding task of interpreting and applying 
the European Convention of Human Rights (henceforth Ôthe ConventionÕ or ÔECHRÕ) to 
member states of the Council of Europe. The chapter begins by setting the stage in two 
ways. First, drawing on recent literature on the subject, I provide a succinct sketch of a 
number of complexity theory concepts and argue that they can be relevant to the study of 
the ECHR. Second, I briefly present the consensus approach and some of the criticisms 
that have been addressed against it, with specific reference to the moral reading of the 
Convention. The moral reading of the ECHR, associated with Ronald DworkinÕs legal 
interpretivism and defended by leading commentators such as George Letsas (Letsas 
2007), is one of the most forceful sources of criticism of the consensus approach. It is 
also an independently plausible and sophisticated theory of interpretation of the ECHR. 
Thus, using complexity theory to show that, despite initial appearances, the moral reading 
of the Convention could be compatible with the consensus approach is an interesting 
result in itself.  
 
 
I aim to do this in the main body of the chapter by first sketching the decision problem 
that the Court faces in a number of hard cases. These involve human rights review of 
state measures emerging through complex patterns of institutional interaction at the 
domestic level. I then provide an outline of a number of constraints that limit the 
epistemic capacity of the ECtHR and can spawn uncertainty about the correct outcome. 
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The difficulty specifically stems from the combination of complexity with limited 
epistemic resources. Next, supposing for the purposes of my argument that the moral 
reading of the Convention is the correct theory of interpretation of the ECHR, I claim 
that, under circumstances of uncertainty, consensus can best be understood as a reasoning 
strategy, and not as a criterion of truth about ECHR rights. It is thus not necessarily 
incompatible with a moral reading of the Convention. Last, I suggest that, qua reasoning 
strategy, the consensus approach could perhaps be best understood and assessed as a 
collective intelligence device. Throughout, the chapter is exploratory rather than 
conclusive. Sketching a possibility is a long way from defending it against all, or even the 
most important, objections. My main goal, rather, is to make conceptual space for further 
and more detailed future work along the lines suggested here. 
 
 
2. Setting the stage (a): complexity theory, domestic legal systems and the ECHR 
 
The theory of Ôcomplex adaptive systemsÕ or simply Ôcomplexity theoryÕ roughly 
designates a family of approaches that initially emerged in natural sciences such as 
ecology and neuroscience to explain ways in which patterned order could emerge from 
the unplanned interactions of a number of heterogeneous agents or elements, be they 
individual neurons vis--vis the brain or colonies of insects (Wheatley 2016: 581 and 
587-588; Page 2010; Ruhl 2008). One of the most important guiding ideas behind 
complexity approaches is the recognition that the state of such systems is not reducible to 
that of their constitutive elements or agents, the system being Ôlarger than the sum of its 
partsÕ (Wheatley 2016: 587). Due to the success of complexity approaches in accounting 
for the function of such natural systems, the approaches were subsequently used to shed 
light on social systems presenting similar attributes, such as economies, domestic 
political systems or systems of states (Page 2010; Wheatley 2016). Importantly, there is 
also now an emerging literature that applies complexity theory to domestic legal systems 
and to international law (Wheatley 2016: 580).  
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Whilst there is no canonical definition of complexity (Wheatley 2016: 589), there is 
broad agreement that a given system, be it natural or social, can be considered complex as 
opposed to merely complicated (Page 2010: 7) when (at least some of) the following 
features are present (Page 2010; Wheatley 2016). First, the system involves the 
interaction of a multiplicity of heterogeneous elements or agents. Second, the system is 
open to an environment that exists outside of it. Third, agents can adapt their behaviour 
on the basis of feedback they receive from other agents or from the environment of the 
system. Fourth, because of heterogeneity and adaptation, the system qua system can have 
properties which are ÔemergentÕ in the specific sense that they supervene upon but are not 
reducible to any of the properties of the individual agents composing the system. Fifth, 
systems may achieve various states of Ôstable disequilibriumÕ and are to this extent Ôself-
organisingÕ. Importantly, this means that the structure of complex systems can sometimes 
achieve a level of spontaneous stability, i.e. stability that is not the result of a Ôcentral 
controllerÕ but, rather, the patterned result of the numerous interactions between its 
constitutive agents. Equally importantly, such stable states are temporary, insofar as they 
are continuously challenged from agents under pressures by the systemÕs environment. 
Sixth, emergent properties as well as temporary states of stable disequilibrium of a 
system may change in Ônon-linear waysÕ, i.e. in ways which are not the direct 
consequence of the behaviour, intended or otherwise, of any individual agent. As a result, 
individual behaviours appearing insignificant or innocuous may have wide systemic 
impact in ways difficult to predict in advance. Seventh, some changes of the emergent 
properties of the system become practically irreversible because of path-dependence 
mechanisms that steer and Ôlock inÕ the system towards one particular direction. 
 
 
Even this brief glance at some generic concepts from complexity theory suffices to 
indicate their potential fruitfulness when it comes to understanding the relationship of the 
ECHR with domestic legal systems. For the purposes of the present chapter, in particular, 
two aspects are essential. The first is to do with the fact that domestic legal systems are 
complex in the sense roughly specified above. To begin with, they are the product of the 
interaction of a multiplicity of heterogeneous agents who can adapt their behaviour to 
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that of other agents within the system. This is especially the case insofar as distributions 
of power allow some agents to block or alter the decision made by other agents. As 
Adrian Vermeule puts it, under these conditions law is the product of the concerted action 
of aggregates of individuals (which comprise institutions), as well as of nested aggregates 
of aggregates (relationships between institutions themselves) (Vermeule 2012: chapter 1). 
The solution provided to some issue under domestic law can thus be an emergent 
property of the system in the sense that it is not necessarily reducible to the action or 
intention of any one agent within the system. Moreover, legal solutions to issues are 
frequently merely the outcome of temporary stable disequilibria, apt to change under a 
different configuration of interactions on the part of the agents composing the system. 
Last, changes to such solutions are prone to phenomena of path-dependence in the sense 
that it may be much more costly or practically impossible to revert the system back to its 
prior state once changes have taken place.  
 
 
The second aspect is to do with the fact that the ECHR itself can be understood as a 
system prone to complexity effects. Thus, and in a non-exhaustive manner, domestic 
agents may adapt their behaviour to accommodate decisions of the ECtHR in potentially 
disruptive ways through, for example, strategic interaction, which may result in the 
system having emergent properties not intended by any one agent. Likewise, the stability 
of the system may be the result of a temporary, stable but dynamic disequilibrium 
resulting from the interactions between the Court and nested aggregates of domestic 
agents or even between individual judges composing the Court.  
 
 
An important premise of this chapter is that both aspects, i.e. those pertaining to the 
complexity of domestic legal systems and those to do with the ECHR itself as a complex 
system, can affect the review of state practices with regard to their compatibility with the 
Convention in a number of important ways. As already indicated, it is not my ambition to 
analyse or even outline all of these ways. Instead, I shall draw out some of the 
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consequences of complexity with regard to the more specific issue of the so-called 
Ôconsensus approachÕ used by the ECtHR, perceived as a reasoning strategy. 
 
 
3. Setting the stage (b): the moral reading of the ECHR, the consensus approach and 
its criticisms 
 
With these preliminary points concerning complexity theory in place, I now move on to 
outline the approach of interpretation of the ECHR that I shall assume throughout the 
chapter. Following Letsas (Letsas 2013:122-141) and Dworkin (Dworkin 1996), I shall 
call it Ômoral readingÕ of the Convention. The approach draws on DworkinÕs legal 
interpretivism to claim that objective moral considerations about the point of abstractly 
formulated ECHR rights necessarily figure among the truth conditions of propositions 
about the content of those rights. In his book-length defence of the moral reading of the 
Convention (Letsas 2007), Letsas suggested that the abstract moral language of the 
ECHR lends itself quite naturally to such a rendering. The main idea is that applying the 
ConventionÕs abstractly formulated rights to particular cases necessitates specification of 
their content through an interpretation of the moral values underpinning and justifying 
these rights. Furthermore, and as a matter of substantive political morality, Letsas favours 
a liberal egalitarian theory of Convention rights, which is robustly anti-perfectionist and 
anti-majoritarian (Letsas 2007, chapter 5). Under such a theory, the purpose of ECHR 
rights is to shield individuals from the hostile preferences of majorities in a wide variety 
of situations. Within this picture, the Court successfully discharges its role by acting as an 
international guardian of equal individual liberty whenever the judicial institutions of 
Contracting States have failed themselves to accomplish this essential task.  
 
 
Letsas plausibly maintains that the CourtÕs interpretive practice provides sufficient 
evidence of endorsement of the moral reading (Letsas 2007, chapter 3). Indeed, through 
its Ôautonomous conceptsÕ and Ôliving instrumentÕ approaches, the Court has opted for a 
purposive interpretation of the Convention, relatively detached from Contracting StatesÕ 
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understandings of ECHR rights. Especially in recent years, Letsas convincingly contends 
(Letsas 2013: 115-122), the CourtÕs practice seems to aim at discovering the objective 
moral truth about the content of ECHR rights. Importantly, Letsas argues, such an 
approach depends on substantive moral considerations and not on Member StatesÕ shared 
understandings. Thus, on the moral reading, the sheer fact that a majority of States 
happens to share a moral view does not make that view true. Accordingly, the goal is to 
establish the objective content of Convention rights, which is not reducible to the content 
that Contracting States merely believe these rights have (Letsas 2004). 
 
 
One central point of contention addressed by the present chapter is whether the moral 
reading of the ECHR is consistent with the so-called Ôconsensus approachÕ adopted by 
the Court. In order to tackle it, we must have some idea of what the approach entails (for 
an exhaustive treatment see Dzehtsiarou 2015). At a first take, the consensus approach 
consists in interpreting and applying Convention rights according to a rough requirement 
of identification of shared understandings and practices across Contracting States. These 
shared understandings and practices serve as a standard whereby to evaluate the 
performance of individual States on the human rights issue adjudicated by the Court. The 
consensus inquiry typically consists in a comparative examination of national
 
(Dzehtsiarou 2015:49-55), European (Dzehtsiarou 2015:40-45) or international 
(Dzehtsiarou 2015:45-49) law and practice. Whilst there are different ways to understand 
the approachÕs function in the CourtÕs reasoning, at a minimum it grounds a Ôrebuttable 
presumptionÕ
 
(Dzehtsiarou 2015: 24-30), if not always a conclusive reason, in favour of a 
given outcome. Moreover, the Court typically links consensus to the Ôdynamic 
interpretationÕ of the ECHR, whereby new interpretations of Convention rights are 
provided in order to treat novel kinds of human rights issues. When it comes to deciding 
on these new interpretations, the Court considers shared StatesÕ understandings and 
practices as a particularly important factor.  
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A non-exhaustive review of the case law reveals a number of features of the CourtÕs 
consensus inquiry that are of particular interest for the purposes of the present chapter. 
First, the Court formulates the issue on which it bases its comparative law inquiry in a 
way specifically tailored to the outcome of the case and to the level of abstraction 
appropriate to the caseÕs particular facts.
1
 Second, by doing this, the Court typically does 
not delve into the reasoning process that led to the particular political decisions made by 
the Contracting States, but merely compares the end results of these decision-making 
processes, to wit, the decisions themselves.
2
 Third, and in view of the above, the Court 
does not provide any deep analysis of the moral point or purpose of the human right 
involved, nor does it engage in direct moral reasoning. Instead, it focuses on the facts of 
the case and to the results of the comparative law inquiry, deferring to common 
understandings of Contracting States in deciding the issue at hand. Fourth, the CourtÕs 
approach consists in loosely aggregating Contracting StatesÕ solutions with respect to the 
identified issue.
3
 Fifth, the choice made by the majority of Contracting States is seen as 
providing a particularly weighty but not necessarily conclusive reason in favour of 
deciding the issue at hand in the same way (Dzehtsiarou 2015: 24-30). Sixth, the CourtÕs 
comparative law inquiry is seldom systematic or comprehensive (Dzehtsiarou 2015). 
Seventh, the Court may consider that the existence of State consensus with respect to 
some issue is a factor that narrows the margin of appreciation of the respondent State
4
, 
but it may also hold that the absence of consensus widens the respondent StateÕs margin 
of appreciation and lowers scrutiny
5
, or, alternatively, that the existence of consensus in 
favour of a particular State measure furnishes a rebuttable presumption that the measure 
is not in violation of the Convention.
6
   
 
 
CommentatorsÕ reactions to uses of the consensus approach have been mixed. While the 
approach has generally been considered as a legitimacy-enhancing mechanism 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
 For a particularly clear example in this and other respects, see S¿rensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark, 
Application Nos. 52562/99 and 52620/99, Judgment of 11 January 2006. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 See, for example, Vo v. France, Application No. 53924/00, Judgment of 8 July 2004. 
6
 See, for example, Pretto and Others v. Italy, Application No. 7984/77, Judgment of 8 December 1983. 
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(Dzehtsiarou 2015: 143-176), it has also been criticised on a number of different grounds. 
We can usefully group such criticisms into two general categories. The first revolves 
around the perceived indeterminacy and lack of precision of the appropriate doctrinal test 
(Helfer, 1993; Ambrus, 2009), which, critics argue, often fails to provide clear guidance 
to States and is sometimes even characterised as ÔrandomÕ (Ambrus 2009: 354) or else 
applied in an imprecise and inconsistent fashion. Critics have also complained that the 
Court frequently fails to define in a clear and consistent way whose consensus should be 
taken into account and how, as well as the correct level of abstraction at which it should 
be formulated (Dzehtsiarou 2015: 14-23). As a result, the manner in which the Court uses 
the consensus approach is often in tension with the rule of law values of legal certainty, 
predictability and equality before the law. Importantly, critics also propose specific ways 
of reconstructing the approach so as to better promote these values (Ambrus 2009: 362-
370). We can thus label this first kind of criticism ÔameliorativeÕ. Scholars engaging in it 
generally agree that the consensus approach is intrinsically valuable, suggesting ways in 
which its application by the Court could be normatively enhanced, once rid of 
inconsistencies and ambiguities. 
 
 
In this chapter, I shall not take issue with such ameliorative criticism. Instead, I shall 
focus on a second, more radical, kind of reproach. Authors that subscribe to this kind of 
argument maintain that the approach is fundamentally at odds with moral requirements 
stemming from the very idea of human rights protection. Accordingly, they urge that it be 
abandoned in favour of direct moral reasoning by the Court. Two mutually reinforcing 
claims are advanced. The first, weaker, claim is to the effect that frequently the consensus 
approach appears to be superfluous. The indeterminacy of the consensus test, critics 
argue, shows that fleeting mention of common understandings in ECtHR judgments 
merely bolsters conclusions already arrived at by recourse to substantive moral reasoning 
at a prior stage (Letsas 2013: 108-115). As Eyal Benvenisti puts it: Ô[consensus] is but a 
convenient subterfuge for implementing the courtÕs hidden principled decisionsÕ 
(Benvenisti 1999: 852). On its face, this claim is compatible with the ameliorative view, 
at least if it turned out that it is possible to formulate the consensus test with a degree of 
! 9 
precision sufficient to provide a well-structured decision procedure. However, the 
superfluity criticism serves as prelude to a second, much stronger, claim, to the effect 
that, even if it were possible to arrive at a precise formulation of the consensus test, the 
consensus approach would still flout the normative requirements stemming from the 
point and purpose of the ECHR. This stronger claim, associated with the moral reading of 
the Convention, is at the heart of debunking criticisms of the consensus approach. It has 
been most forcefully and clearly articulated by Letsas (Letsas 2004; Letsas 2007: chapter 
2).  
 
 
In order to better grasp why Letsas argues that the consensus approach is not merely 
superfluous, but in fact incompatible with the moral reading of the Convention, recall the 
CourtÕs reasoning in such cases, outlined above. By resorting to consensus, the Court 
apparently abstains from providing any substantive normative reasons about the point, 
purpose and moral value of ECHR rights. Instead, it seems to merely defer to what it 
thinks the common European standard is with respect to the human rights issue at hand, 
identified by a vague reference to the practices of the majority of Contracting States (or 
even practices of non-Contracting States and other international institutions). This is, for 
example, exactly the way in which the Court appears to have recently proceeded in the 
particularly controversial Lautsi v. Italy and S.A.S. v. France cases.
7
 From the vantage 
point of the moral reading of the ECHR, the CourtÕs choices raise two broad kinds of 
concern. First, by resorting to common understandings of Contracting States through the 
comparative law study of the solutions adopted by these States on a given Convention 
right issue, the Court would aggregate solutions determined by the beliefs of political 
majorities about the content of Convention rights. It would thus appear to presuppose that 
these beliefs, and not independently identifiable moral values, determine the content of 
ECHR rights (Letsas 2004). Letsas contends that this attitude is in tension with 
StrasbourgÕs Ôinterpretive ethicÕ (Letsas 2010), which gives pride of place to the idea that 
the moral values underpinning ECHR rights are objective and, as such, irreducible to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7
 See Lautsi and others v. Italy, Application No. 30814/06, Judgment of 18 March 2011; S.A.S. v. France, 
Application No. 43835/11, Judgment of 1 July 2014.    
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beliefs that Contracting States hold about them (see also Benvenisti 1999). Second, 
adding insult to injury, the consensus approach would also appear to flout the very 
normative raison dÕtre of Convention rights: the fact that they are rights purporting to 
protect individuals and minorities from the hostile preferences of majorities. In particular, 
as already indicated, it would seem to follow from the anti-majoritarian nature of ECHR 
rights that the Court has the mission to provide an independent moral check on Member 
States with respect to Convention rights issues. The Court arguably fails to do this when 
it merely mirrors or upholds Member StatesÕ majoritarian current practices and beliefs. 
 
 
LetsasÕ forceful critique seems to present proponents of the consensus approach that also 
subscribe to the moral reading of the Convention with a harsh dilemma. If they want to 
stick to some version of the consensus requirement, they should either abandon their 
commitment to objective moral truth by espousing a conventionalist view to the effect 
that the Contracting StatesÕ concurring beliefs figure among the determinants of the 
content of Convention rights, or else they should adopt a theory of ECHR rights that 
makes majoritarian preferences the determining moral factor. Both of those alternatives 
are unattractive. On the one hand, moral conventionalism seats uneasily with the 
universalist ambition of human rights, as well as with the CourtÕs own method of 
Ôautonomous conceptsÕ (Letsas 2004). On the other hand, consequentialist moral 
conceptions such as utilitarianism, which roughly make maximisation of aggregate 
preference-satisfaction an objective criterion of moral rightness, are widely believed to be 
traditional enemies of human rights and could hardly be considered as natural candidates 
for an attractive conception of Convention rights (Letsas 2007, chapter 5).  
 
 
4. Decisions for complex normative systems: the problem of uncertainty 
 
Do the above considerations exhaust what sense there is to be made of the consensus 
approach under a moral reading of the ECHR? I beg to differ. In other work 
(Tsarapatsanis 2015), I have developed an institutional account of the CourtÕs interpretive 
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practice, defending the margin of appreciation doctrine by appealing to normative 
considerations pertaining to shared responsibility and subsidiarity in the implementation 
of the Convention. It is a significant virtue of institutional accounts that they purport to 
explain and justify doctrines of judicial deference and self-restraint, such as the 
consensus approach or the margin of appreciation, without abandoning the ambition of 
reading the ECHR morally. Institutional accounts supplant the moral reading of the 
Convention: they hold that institutional reasons about the proper division of labour 
between the Court and national institutions, and not merely substantive ones about the 
moral point or value of human rights, are relevant to the determination of judicial 
outcomes. Unlike substantive reasons, which abstract from the identity of the Court qua 
court and refer only to the merits of the individual case, institutional reasons apply 
specifically to the Court as an enforcing institutional agent, by determining the CourtÕs 
powers and responsibilities within a wider scheme of institutional cooperation. Such 
reasons may justify the CourtÕs responsibility to defer to Contracting StatesÕ shared 
understandings of Convention rights irrespective of the fact that these understandings are 
potentially at odds with the content of Convention rights seen from the perspective of an 
ideal moral theory of human rights. Moreover, these considerations are not ad hoc, 
applying only within the narrow context of the ECHR legal order, but pervasive in public 
law more generally (Kyritsis 2015). Institutional approaches to judicial decision-making 
usually highlight issues of judicial competence and legitimacy as factors justifying both 
judicial restraint and deference to the choices made by the political branches of 
government. Judicial duties of deference to democratically legitimated institutions, 
underscored by institutional accounts, thus seems to cohere particularly well with the 
general structure of the consensus approach used by the ECtHR. 
 
 
Nevertheless, in this chapter I contend that there is one additional question that should be 
asked with regard to the nature and role of the consensus approach and that insights from 
complexity theory are absolutely crucial to answering it. To begin with, recall that, by 
adopting a moral reading of the ECHR, I assume that pertinent moral reasons, both 
substantive and institutional, together with whatever empirical facts are made relevant by 
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these reasons, jointly determine the truth-values of propositions of Convention rights. 
The question, then, is whether the above reasons and facts are epistemically accessible to 
judges given the judgesÕ actual (as opposed to ideal) cognitive and, more generally, 
epistemic capacities. And, if so, what are the conditions and costs of such accessibility? 
This further question is particularly important, not least because efficient and reliable 
decision-making by the Court is not a theoretical, but an eminently practical enterprise. 
That real, flesh-and-blood judges be able to reliably discover normative and empirical 
facts determining the truth-values of particular propositions of Convention rights at an 
acceptable cost is what really matters in the collective enterprise of interpretation and 
enforcement of the Convention. Thus, even if there were, abstractly speaking, 
determinate objective right answers to all possible questions posed by the application of 
the Convention under a moral reading, their sheer existence would be utterly useless for 
the purposes of the administration of an effective regional system of human rights 
protection, should it turn out that these answers are epistemically inaccessible to real, as 
opposed to ideal, judges, or accessible only at very high costs by comparison to the 
benefits delivered. I shall call this the epistemic challenge to the moral reading of the 
ECHR. I shall also claim that complexity theory is particularly important to framing and 
understanding the depth of the challenge, before moving on to suggest that consensus 
may provide an acceptable solution to it. 
 
 
The epistemic challenge helps bring into sharper focus the decision problem that judges 
of the Court face in hard cases. Succinctly put, the nature of the problem results from the 
combination of two sets of factors. First, under a moral reading of the Convention the 
considerations that provide reasons for individual judges to decide cases are frequently 
not just complicated but complex in the specific sense outlined earlier. Second, individual 
judges are boundedly rational. As a result, judges deciding in good faith are often unsure 
about the best course of action. In what follows, I shall begin by substantiating the first 
part of the claim. Grasping the role of complexity as a systematic generator of uncertainty 
in the functioning of the ECHR normative system is crucial. Then, in the next subsection 
I shall focus on a number of features that constrain the epistemic capacities of judges. 
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A. Complexity and the decision problem faced by ECtHR judges 
 
We can sharpen our initial grasp of the decision problem by tentatively distinguishing 
between three kinds of factors that the ECtHR must take into account when deciding 
cases: those relating to individual justice, those relating to the effect that the CourtÕs case-
law has on the wider system of protection of rights under the ECHR and those relating to 
strategic considerations, widely conceived. The first are to do with granting appropriate 
relief to the particular individual complaining of a violation of a Convention right by a 
State Party. The second revolve around the impact the case law of the Court has on the 
ECHR system of protection of human rights as a whole. The third concern different and 
complex contexts of interaction between, on the one hand, individual members of a 
collegial Court among themselves and, on the other hand, interaction of the Court as a 
whole with States Parties taken individually or in tandem. When consulting the proposed 
tripartite list, it is helpful to keep in mind two things. First, the distinction between 
different kinds of factors introduced here is not intended to reflect any deep properties of 
the factors themselves. It merely serves the tentative aim of helping us organise our 
thinking about the specification of the decision problem in hard cases. Thus, and to take 
an example, the reader should feel free to subsume the category of strategic 
considerations under either of the first two categories, if she perhaps thinks that these are 
not independent enough. Second, no controversial claim is made regarding the relative 
force of the reasons that the factors generate. This depends entirely on a fuller and more 
detailed specification of the point and purpose of the ECHR, which falls squarely outside 
the scope of this chapter. As a result, the list proposed here will have served its function 
if it can be plausibly accepted by people that otherwise reasonably disagree on the point 
and purpose of the ECHR and, accordingly, on the different weights to be assigned to the 
normative reasons stemming from the indicated factors. 
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We may begin by individual justice. It is uncontroversial that one of the ECHRÕs most 
dazzling achievements to date has been the initial recognition and gradual reinforcement 
of a right to individual petition, especially after the adoption of Additional Protocol 11 
(Greer 2006: 1-59). The function of providing redress for alleged Convention rights 
violations by States Parties for the benefit of specific individuals is one of the CourtÕs 
most important tasks. Uncertainty with regard to the proper resolution of hard cases can 
occur at this level, without any need to take into account the wider effects of the case law 
of the Court on the ECHR system as a whole or of strategic considerations. In particular, 
judges can, for example, be uncertain or in reasonable disagreement about the best moral 
theory of human rights or about specific conceptions of such rights even from within an 
agreed upon general theory, or about how to balance the protection of individual rights 
with institutional considerations such as the democratic legitimacy of the decisions taken 
by Member States. In all these cases, nuanced judgment would be appropriate and 
reasonable judges could disagree about how best to exercise it. However, it is important 
to note that, if hard cases and uncertainty under a moral reading of the ECHR were only 
to do with the administration of individual justice in the above sense, then the decision 
problem that the Court faces would perhaps be difficult, but not necessarily complex in 
the sense specified above. In particular, there would not be any need to take into account 
adaptive interactions between the ECHR and domestic legal systems, since these factors 
would just be irrelevant with regard to the CourtÕs mission. 
 
 
I thus submit that what really makes the decision problem that the ECtHR faces not just 
difficult but complex, in the sense specified earlier on in the chapter, is the importance of 
taking into account, first, the impact that its decisions have on the wider system of 
protection of Convention rights, and, second, strategic considerations about the 
interaction of the Court with various institutional actors whose help and cooperation is 
vital in effectively enforcing the ECHR. Beginning with the first issue, it is important to 
note that, in many cases, the CourtÕs judgments do not just resolve an issue relating to an 
individual claim of alleged ECHR violation following a petition, but, rather, set the 
minimum threshold of Convention rights protection across all Contracting States. Thus, a 
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judgment by the Court finding a violation of the Convention in a specific case often 
entails not only that the respondent State ought to modify its legislation, but also that all 
other Member States that have similar legislation ought to change it. Using examples 
from the case law of the Court may helpfully bring out the point. Thus, when the Court 
takes a position on issues such as same-sex marriage
8
, abortion
9
, closed-shop 
agreements
10
 or prisonersÕ voting rights
11
, it is de facto if not de jure, defining the 
minimal level of protection that will have to be accorded by all States Parties with regard 
to the issue that is decided. However, as already noted, it is one of the major insights of 
complexity theory that the solutions provided by complex domestic systems to various 
issues are emergent properties of deeper interactions between adaptive agents reflecting 
dynamic temporary disequilibria. At the very least, then, and given phenomena of path-
dependence, the Court has to be particularly careful when governing complex domestic 
systems, since the costs of imposing an erroneous unique solution to a given issue may 
make it subsequently infeasible to return the system to a previous state. Besides, this 
problem can be particularly acute when the correctness of the solution to some 
Convention issue depends heavily on empirical parameters as appears, for example, to be 
the case in S¿rensen, mentioned in section 3 above, where the question was whether the 
legitimate aims pursued through closed-shop legislation could have been achieved in the 
absence of such legislation. 
 
 
Complexity phenomena are also at play with regard to a variety of strategic interactions 
that are pertinent to deciding ECHR issues. In fact, the Court has to pay heed to the way 
other institutional actors are likely to apply its case law and, insofar as it does, it must 
have some view about the outcomes of such future interactions. The Court is part of a 
wider system of protection of ECHR rights, governed by the principle of subsidiarity and 
marked by an institutional partnership with domestic actors, which are under a duty to 
make their distinctive contributions within the system. This is the whole point, for 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8
 See Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, Application No. 30141/04, Judgment of 24 June 2010. 
9
 See A, B and C v. Ireland, Application No. 25579/05, Judgment of 16 December 2010.  
10
 See S¿rensen judgment, n.1 above.  
11
 See Hirst v. the United Kingdom (No.2), Application No 74025/01, Judgment of 6 October  
2005. 
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example, of the rule of the exhaustion of domestic remedies before an application to the 
Court is deemed admissible (Tsarapatsanis 2015: 686). Moreover, similar concerns also 
arise from the practical problems that the Court faces in the effective implementation of 
the Convention. Insofar as the Court has limited capacity, a large part of the role of 
handling implementation issues will inescapably be played by domestic authorities, 
which comprise but are not limited to courts. Issues of strategic interaction can also stem 
from the fact that the Court is an international Court, with the result that political 
reactions to the implementation of its judgments by domestic authorities are harder to 
overcome than those faced by domestic courts. Thus, securing effective state compliance, 
either with regard to the behaviour of a single state when it comes to the implementation 
of a particular judgment
12
 or, more generally, with regard to the patterned behaviour of 
states that appear to systematically challenge the legitimacy of the Court on any number 
of issues, can be an important source of normative considerations. Here again, 
complexity theory delivers crucial insights, since it holds that states of (dis)equilibria of 
complex systems are always temporary and subject to disruption by adaptive behaviours 
of agents. This suggests that compliance and cooperation by Contracting States should 
not be taken for granted, but, rather, should be seen as the emergent and potentially 
fragile property of past interactions between the Court and domestic legal actors. 
Perceived legitimacy of the Court by domestic agents can go some way towards 
addressing those issues, since it may stabilise and streamline expected behaviours. Still, 
there might be a real sense in which the complexity of the ECHR system and the 
multiplicity of agentsÕ interactions make the impact of certain outcomes genuinely 
uncertain.                 
  
 
Besides, considerations stemming from patterns of strategic interaction are also at play at 
the level of decision-making by the Court itself. In fact, as Vermeule has forcefully 
pointed out (Vermeule 2012: chapter 5), in multi-member courts, such as the ECtHR, 
individual judges favouring a particular optimal solution to a decision problem have to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12
 See, as a salient example, the non-compliance (yet) by the United Kingdom with regard to the Hirst case 
(above n.8). 
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take into account the fact that they are sitting on a panel with other judges who may 
disagree with their views. Accordingly, and to take a hypothetical example, a judge who 
adheres to the moral reading of the Convention will have to make do with the fact that 
she is sitting on a panel with other judges who may not share her first-best interpretive 
approach. Other judges might thus be positivists or adopt some other approach. 
Interactions among judges are thus complex in the specific sense that the outcome of 
those interactions (the final judgment) is an emergent property of the Court, which does 
not necessarily reduce to the actions or intentions of individual judges. Moreover, states 
of doctrinal or interpretive stability on the part of the Court are also temporary and 
potentially fragile, since they reflect the underlying complex emergent patterns of 
interactions among individual judges.  
 
 
Now, complex situations such as these present judges with an important decision 
problem. The rational judge that finds herself in the minority will have to opt for a 
suboptimal solution by her own lights. As Vermeule puts it (Vermeule 2012: 156-160), at 
this point she has a number of different strategic choices at her disposal. For example, she 
might adopt an ÔevangelistÕ approach, disregarding the consequences of her behaviour in 
particular cases with the hope that, in the long run, she may convert other judges by the 
sheer force of her example. But she might also settle for a second-best view by 
strategically using her resources in some other way, for example by influencing the 
formulation of the reasons provided if she agrees with the outcome. Whilst this approach 
might initially seem opportunistic, it is far from evident that it is inconsistent with the 
very idea of the moral reading, since at a minimum it leads to acceptable outcomes by the 
judgeÕs own lights. Be that as it may, the more general claim is to the effect that all cases 
of strategic interaction sketched above involve versions of the same core problem: how to 
cope with the fact that, once a moral reading is adopted as the best interpretive approach 
towards the ECHR, the judge adopting the approach has to cooperate with actors that do 
not necessarily share that view and which have the power to influence the real world 
effects of the implementation of the Convention. 
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B. Epistemic constraints and reasoning strategies 
 
As already observed, complexity with regard to systemic effects or strategic interactions 
is only one of the sources of judicial uncertainty. Uncertainty with regard to interpretation 
and application of the ECHR can be also exacerbated because of a number of familiar 
cognitive and epistemic constraints akin to what Christopher Cherniak (Cherniak 1986: 
8) has called the Ôfinitary predicamentÕ of human epistemic agents, to wit, the fact that 
their cognitive resources are limited. As a result of the finitary predicament, human 
agentsÕ rationality has been called resource-dependent or bounded (Bishop and Trout 
2005). Bounded rationality approaches focus on how agents with limited information, 
time and cognitive capacities ought to make judgments and decisions (Tsarapatsanis 
2015: 689-691). The approaches became particularly prominent since the 1970s, when an 
impressive array of experimental results in social psychology consistently showed that, 
under certain circumstances, human agents reason and decide in ways that systematically 
violate the formal canons of rationality (Bishop and Trout 2005). At least part of the 
explanation for these shortcomings is attributed to the lack of cognitive resources 
available to human agents. Charting the actual limits of these resources is an important 
part of cognitive science and empirical psychology. Both conceptualise the mind as a 
finite information-processing device, strictly limited with regards to its memory, attention 
and computation capacities. These general considerations, which apply to judges insofar 
as the latter are human epistemic agents like any other, are complemented in a 
straightforward way by specific constraints on how the Court functions. Thus, pressures 
involving the capacity to efficiently process applications and deliver judgments in a 
timely fashion can turn out to be significant, insofar as the Court has a backlog of tens of 
thousands of pending cases
13
 and is also committed to issuing decisions promptly as a 
matter of human rights (for more on these constraints see Tsarapatsanis 2015: 690). 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13
 There were 64,850 pending cases as of 31/12/2015. See the ECtHRÕs 2015 report at p.187 available here: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2015_ENG.pdf (last accessed 1/4/2017). 
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Now, as already indicated, under the moral reading of the ECHR, certain kinds of 
normative and empirical facts determine the truth-values of propositions of Convention 
rights. In order to achieve the epistemic goal of apprehending these facts, judges need to 
deploy the appropriate epistemic means. I shall refer to these means as Ôreasoning 
strategiesÕ. Two kinds of normative constraints may be reasonably imposed on the 
selection of these strategies. First, they ought to be reliable, i.e. such as to allow agents to 
systematically track the relevant facts. This follows directly from the fact that, under the 
moral reading of the ECHR, the epistemic goal of judges is objective truth and not some 
other aim, such as justifiability or reasonableness. Second, they ought to be tractable, i.e. 
suitable for judges as epistemic agents endowed with finite cognitive resources.  
 
 
Tractability brings immediately into play the epistemic constraints sketched above, 
especially bounded rationality. Thus, bounded rationality accounts ask which reasoning 
strategies agents with constrained cognitive resources ought to follow in order to reliably 
attain sets of specified epistemic goals for different kinds of environments. Accordingly, 
the reasoning strategies identified for boundedly rational agents are resource-relative: 
they are tailored to the actual cognitive abilities and resources of agents. Resource-
relativity as a constraint on the selection of reasoning strategies can be justified in various 
ways. To begin with, one can appeal to the Ôought-implies-canÕ norm: no judge should 
use a reasoning strategy that is clearly intractable. Moreover, and more controversially, 
reasoning strategies are also constrained by cost/benefit considerations. Suppose, for 
example that, if judges of the Court had infinite time, they could score better on the 
reliability dimension. However, ECtHR judges do not have infinite time and, in fact, they 
are under relentless time pressure, amplified by the ever-increasing volume of their 
caseload. It follows that, depending on the circumstances in which they are placed, judges 
could sometimes reasonably trade off marginal increases in reliability for speed, by 
following appropriately economical reasoning strategies, such as a more deferential and 
less fine-grained standard of review, through the margin of appreciation doctrine, if they 
have reason to trust the judgment of national authorities (Tsarapatsanis 2015: 685). 
Generalising the point, we might say that it is not enough that reasoning strategies score 
! 20 
high on the reliability dimension: it is important that they also come at an acceptable cost 
with regard to the finite epistemic resources of judges.  
 
 
The upshot for the purposes of the present discussion is that reasoning strategies that take 
the formulation of objectively true propositions about the ECHR under a moral reading as 
their epistemic goal ought to take account of the judgesÕ epistemic resources limitations. 
Even if the relevant moral and empirical facts could in principle be accessible to 
resource-independent agents, such as agents with normal perceptual capacities that 
perform no reasoning mistakes, have sets of completely consistent beliefs and infinite 
memory and time, we still ought to ask, first, whether they are they also in principle 
accessible to resource-dependent judges sitting at the ECtHR and, second, at what cost. 
Moreover, the epistemic constraints briefly alluded to in this section exacerbate the 
problem of responding appropriately to the uncertainty that the complexity of the ECHR 
system of rights protection generates in hard cases. This is so even without supposing that 
disagreement about the identification of the relevant moral facts poses any special 
epistemic problem per se. Whilst disagreement among epistemic peers can sometimes 
cause considerable uncertainty, my primary focus here is on the resource-restrained 
epistemic abilities of judges, which would be important even if disagreement were 
completely absent. 
 
6. The consensus approach as a reasoning strategy 
 
To summarise the argument thus far, I have stressed that in hard cases judges of the Court 
can be uncertain about the best solution, owing to the non-exhaustively specified 
combination of sheer difficulty, complexity of systemic impact and strategic interaction 
and epistemic constraints. This is the case even if we assume, as I did throughout the 
chapter by adopting the moral reading of the ECHR, that there are objective right answers 
to hard cases. Given the pervasive epistemic issues I mentioned, it is possible and in fact 
desirable to distinguish between objective solutions to hard cases and reliable and 
tractable reasoning strategies for actual (as opposed to ideal) boundedly rational ECtHR 
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judges. Whereas the former, under the moral reading of the ECHR, make objective 
morality a constitutive part of what makes propositions about the ECHR true, the latter 
aim at articulating ways for non-ideal agents to gain access to this truth by maximising 
the chances of correct outcomes or minimising the risks of incorrect ones. It could thus be 
the case that judges might be more likely to arrive at the objectively correct outcome 
under a moral reading in an oblique way, rather than via direct moral reasoning. From the 
point of view of criteria of assessment of reasoning strategies, unconstrained moral 
reasoning shall have to be compared with a number of contenders and evaluated across a 
number of dimensions, chief among which figure reliability and tractability. 
 
I thus submit that the consensus approach should be understood as just one of those 
contenders, i.e. as an oblique reasoning strategy which bypasses unconstrained moral 
reasoning and is apt to aid ECtHR judges in arriving at correct decisions whilst 
attempting to effectively govern a complex system. There are two points that should be 
noted here. First, classifying the consensus approach as a reasoning strategy and not as a 
criterion of truth of propositions about the ECHR straightforwardly avoids LetsasÕ 
criticism of the consensus approach outlined above. In particular, on this understanding 
consensus does not determine the truth about ECHR rights, and therefore does not 
amount to majoritarianism about human rights. It is merely a heuristic device that may 
provide epistemic help to judges under conditions of uncertainty generated by 
complexity. Second, the argument of this chapter is that heuristics such as consensus can 
provide such an epistemic help under conditions of uncertainty and as a means to address 
it. No claim is thus made that consensus would be relevant to the moral reading even in 
the absence of uncertainty. However, it is indeed argued that, once the insights from 
complexity theory are fully taken into account, uncertainty proves to be a particularly 
pervasive phenomenon with regard to ECHR adjudication. 
 
 
At this point, an important caveat should be underscored. It is one thing to indicate the 
possibility of understanding the consensus approach as a reasoning strategy, which was 
my main aim in this chapter, and it is quite another to argue in favour of the overall 
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plausibility of such an approach qua reasoning strategy. Moreover, a fuller account 
should compare the relative merits of the consensus approach with those of other 
approaches, such as unconstrained moral reasoning, potentially specifying contexts in 
which the use one or the other could be more warranted. Since I do not have the space for 
a detailed treatment, I shall only provide a number of tentative considerations in favour of 
such plausibility, which open venues for future research, along with a number of critical 
comments.  
 
 
I have already said that reasoning strategies for non-ideal epistemic agents should be 
assessed along the twin dimensions of reliability and tractability. Complexity theory 
provides an important source of considerations in favour of using consensus as a 
reasoning strategy along these dimensions. As already observed, consensus takes account 
of solutions to ECHR issues that have emerged spontaneously from the interactions of 
agents composing domestic legal systems, and which it could be perilous to upset absent 
very strong reasons. Moreover, imposing a completely novel solution in the absence of 
consensus could carry significant costs in case the wrong decision is made, due to path-
dependence. These considerations at the very least suggest that concerns deriving from 
aspects of complexity theory can inform a prudential attitude on the part of judges, 
especially when it comes to assessing solutions to ECHR issues that could have wider 
systemic impact. Likewise, and with respect to tractability, identification of common 
solutions adopted by Contracting States may be much more economical than calculation 
of complex normative and empirical factors. 
 
 
Moreover, qua reasoning strategy, consensus may also be useful as a collective 
intelligence device. Collective intelligence arguments can take many different forms, but 
they revolve around the core notion that, under certain conditions, collectives may 
epistemically outperform individuals. Among the arguments advanced is the Condorcet 
Jury Theorem (henceforth ÔCJTÕ), which roughly states that aggregating the beliefs of 
sincerely voting independent individuals on some subject, at least when the individuals 
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are more likely to be right than wrong, increases the likelihood of choosing the right 
answer.
14
 Interestingly, Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein have explicitly used CJT to argue 
that, under certain conditions, aggregating the solutions that relevantly similar states have 
provided to some issue can provide a good reason to believe that the majority solution is 
correct (Posner and Sunstein 2006). While the proposal is far from uncontroversial and 
faces a number of technical challenges that cannot be addressed in detail here, it provides, 
if plausible, a clear justification for some (disciplined) form of the consensus inquiry qua 
reasoning strategy. In the same vein, it could be possible to explore the plausibility of 
models of cognitive diversity (Page 2007). Roughly, the core idea of such models is that 
aggregating views based on different interpretations of how the world works maximises 
the chances that the median answer will be right as opposed to the one provided by a 
randomly chose individual from the group (Page 2007: 197). As in the application of CJT 
to solutions provided by domestic legal systems to various issues, it bears further 
exploring whether cognitive diversity models could also provide a justification for the 
consensus approach. 
 
 
Here again, the notion of collective intelligence connects to insights from complexity 
theory. The solutions to various human rights issues provided by Contracting States could 
be understood as emergent properties of complex national legal systems, resulting from 
the interactions of the agents composing those systems and not reducible to their 
individual actions or intentions. Common patterns of such emergent properties could thus 
be harnessed to enhance the cognitive capacities of ECtHR judges under conditions of 
uncertainty. Moreover, disciplining and streamlining the use of consensus through more 
formal models such as CJT or cognitive diversity could help augment the legitimacy of 
the Court as well as the predictability of its reasoning, with beneficial effects with respect 
to both compliance and cooperation. Last, insofar as the consensus inquiry provides clear 
results due to common patterns of solutions, it can help stabilise the behaviour of diverse 
judges in a way that unconstrained moral reasoning, which frequently leads to 
disagreement, perhaps cannot. In this way, it could help address the issue of strategic 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 For an informal presentation of CJT see the work of Hlne Landemore (Landemore 2013: 70-75). 
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interaction of judges in multimember courts. The flipside of this, with regard to 
tractability, is that access to reliable information about the solutions adopted by different 
Contracting States and aggregation of those solutions to provide a (rebuttable) guide for 
decision under uncertainty carries its own important costs. Whether such a reasoning 
strategy is ultimately more frugal, relative to gains in reliability, than deciding by 
unconstrained moral reasoning will thus depend on specifics that cannot be touched upon 
here.  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I argued that, understood as a reasoning strategy, the consensus approach 
is compatible with a moral reading of the ECHR. My main argument consists in 
distinguishing between criteria of truth of propositions about Convention rights and 
reasoning strategies. The function of the latter is merely epistemic. Using insights from 
complexity theory, I claimed that some reasoning strategies could be rational responses to 
the decision problem judges of the Court face in hard cases. In these cases, uncertainty is 
not accidental but the combined product of the bounded rationality of judges with often-
complex factors, such as strategic interactions and systemic effects of the CourtÕs 
judgments. I then contended that a number of heuristic devices used by the Court, such as 
the consensus approach, should be best understood as reasoning strategies and not as 
criteria of truth of propositions about the ECHR. Last, I briefly sketched the possibility 
that insights from complexity theory could also be used to justify using the consensus 
approach as a collective intelligence device. However, a lot more would need to be said 
in order to fully assess the relative merits of the consensus approach compared to other 
approaches, such as unconstrained moral reasoning. I therefore conclude by submitting 
that more systematic exploration of specific reasoning strategies for Courts facing hard 
cases in complex normative environments could yield high theoretical and possibly 
practical payoffs.   
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